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Abstract 
As part of international climate change policy, voluntary opt-in programs to reduce emissions in 
unregulated sectors or countries have spurred considerable discussion. Since any regulator will 
make errors in predicting baselines, adverse selection will reduce efficiency since participants will 
self-select into the program. In contrast, pure subsidies lead to full participation but require large 
financial transfers; this is a particular challenge across countries. A global social planner facing 
costless transfers would choose such a subsidy to maximize efficiency. However, any actual 
policy needs to be individually rational for both the buying (industrialized) and selling 
(developing) country.  We present a simple model to analyze this trade-off between adverse 
selection and infra-marginal transfers. The model leads to the following findings. First, extending 
the scale of voluntary programs both improves efficiency and reduces transfers. Second, the set 
of individually rational and Pareto efficient policies typically features a combination of credit 
discounting and stringent assigned baselines which reduce efficiency. Third, if the industrialized 
countries can be persuaded to be more generous, the feasible policy set can come close to the 
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1. Motivation 
Many reports (e.g. Stern, 2006) and key policy makers assert that avoiding deforestation 
is a key short-run climate mitigation option because of the apparently low abatement costs 
(Kindermann et al., 2008). Melillo et al. (2009) and Wise et al. (2009) both show that it is critically 
important to price carbon in forests, especially if there are positive incentives for biofuels. 
Current estimates of the forest carbon supply curve are based on either land use responses to 
commodity prices (e.g. Kerr et al., 2002), or on estimates of the opportunity cost of land. These 
approaches do not take into account the difficulty of designing effective policies to address 
deforestation in developing countries, where most deforestation occurs (e.g. Andam et al., 2008; 
Blackman et al., 2009; Pfaff et al., 2007). They assume the application of efficient price-based 
policies, yet actual price-based policies for climate mitigation in developing countries are still 
mostly limited to offset programs. Examples include the payments for ecosystem services 
program in Costa Rica and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), where actors are given 
credit for forest remaining above an estimated and assigned baseline, or for emission reductions 
below a baseline.   
Offset programs have been shown to suffer from serious problems of spurious credits 
and low effectiveness as a result of adverse selection.  Adverse selection is caused by a 
combination of two factors: a voluntary element (i.e., agents can choose whether or not to opt in 
to the program) and asymmetric information about the baseline (i.e., the agents know more about 
their true baseline than the regulator).
1
Several designs have been proposed for an international program to reduce deforestation 
(most recently referred to as REDD – reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation) 
and some are beginning to be implemented on a wider scale – notably Norway’s innovative 
contract with Guyana.
  
2  All proposed policies have elements of offsets in their design and face a 
tradeoff between efficiency and the desire of the funders of such programs to get the best value 
for the money that they spend. This tradeoff exists because more generous or expensive 
programs (higher payments, with more favorable baselines) are more efficient.
3
                                                 
1 Montero (2000), Fischer (2005) and Arguedas and van Soest (2009) establish theoretical results. Montero (1999) 
gives the first empirical evidence in the case of the US acid rain program. He and Morse (2010) and Millard-Ball  
(2010) explore similar issues in the energy sector for the CDM and for sectoral transportation caps respectively. 
  
2 See Chomitz (2007), Plantinga and Richards (2008) and Richards and Andersson (2000) for discussion of the 
challenges. 
3 Several studies provide evidence on the efficiency effects of adverse selection in the context of Costa Rican 
deforestation (Kerr et al., 2004; Robalino et al., 2008; Sanchez et al., 2007). Busch et al. (2009) focus on the global 
efficiency effects of different baselines (reference levels) in a deforestation program.   2 
 
To the best of our knowledge, no one has previously formally analyzed three key options 
to reduce this tradeoff in a realistic policy context. In addition, while previous research has 
focused on designing mechanisms to reduce deforestation in developing countries in the 
presence of asymmetric information, the policies of the industrialized countries that buy credits 
or provide funds are often considered unconstrained (Strand, 1997). This paper explicitly 
considers welfare in both developing and industrialized countries, and highlights the limitations 
that voluntary participation by industrialized countries places on the set of implementable 
policies. Specifically, the paper explores the role of project scale, discounting (paying less than 
the full value for reductions) and baseline manipulation (making baselines either more or less 
stringent than business as usual) in a formal model. We use a microeconomic model of land use 
and mechanism design with a combination of analytical results and numerical simulations to 
show that (1) increasing the required scale of projects that can participate both improves 
efficiency and lowers transfers; (2) if industrialized countries are averse to transfers to developing 
countries they will optimally use a mixture of discounting and stringent baselines at the cost of 
some efficiency loss; and (3) if the industrialized countries can be persuaded to be more generous 
it will be easier to create an efficient policy to avoid deforestation. Our presentation focuses on 
deforestation but the results are equally applicable to any other mitigation options in developing 
countries, as well as wider applications of voluntary offset programs. 
Our paper can be interpreted as an analysis of either adding avoided deforestation to a 
broader cap and trade market, or as an international fund used to pay for avoided deforestation 
to supplement a separate cap on other emissions. Both programs involve a baseline level of 
forest and provide rewards relative to that.  In a cap and trade market these rewards would be 
credits valued at the market price, whereas in the fund these rewards would be dollars. In both 
programs industrialized countries pay for the reductions that are achieved in developing 
countries. These two approaches are equivalent under the following assumptions. First, the 
rewards must be the same per unit of avoided deforestation. To set fund payouts that meet this 
assumption requires that the aggregate marginal cost functions of the forest landowners are 
known so that the market price in the cap and trade system can be predicted accurately.  Second, 
the cap and trade market emissions cap and the level of the fund can be adjusted so that 
regardless of which approach is used, both the global environmental outcome and the permit 
price are identical. That is, the fund level would need to be set such that the environmental gains 
it achieved were equal to the difference in environmental gains between the environmental cap 3 
 
of the larger broad cap and trade system (including avoided deforestation) and the original cap 
and trade market (excluding avoided deforestation).
4
 Three criteria that are of direct relevance to policy makers are used to assess the impacts 
of different conditions and policies: efficiency; the level of avoided deforestation and the 
payments per hectare of avoided deforestation. Efficiency is determined by whether land goes to 
its optimal use – land that yields high agricultural or timber returns should be cleared; land with 
returns lower than the positive environmental externalities from the forest should not. While 
policy focuses only on climate related externalities, we might also be concerned about avoided 
deforestation as an end in itself; this is the motivation for the second criterion. The final criterion 
is concerned with the value that industrialized countries get for the money they transfer to 
developing countries. 
   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model of 
voluntary deforestation policy that operates first at the level of individual plots, and then for 
larger scales. This demonstrates the trade-off between efficiency loss from adverse selection and 
the level of transfers, and analyzes how the three policy criteria are affected by the shapes of the 
distributions of land returns and observation  errors. Section 3 discusses how the potential 
objectives are affected by three different policy choices: increasing the scale required for 
participation, changing the carbon payment (equivalent to “discounting credits”) and changing 
the generosity of the assigned baseline. Section 4 provides a framework to make optimal trade-
offs among objectives  while  taking into account the divergent interests of developing and 
industrialized countries and numerically analyzes the optimal policy. Section 5 concludes and 
summarizes the main policy implications. 
2. A Simple Model of Voluntary Opt-In 
2.1.  Efficient subsidies versus baselines with adverse selection 
Consider a continuum of plots of forested land, indexed by i. Decisions on each plot are 
independent. Landowners decide to either clear fully or keep the forest. Landowners will clear 
                                                 
4 Suppose industrialized countries (ICs) have a joint emissions cap that requires them to undertake abatement of A. 
Total abatement cost (TAC) is the integral under the IC marginal abatement cost curve up to A. The market price 
of pollution equals pc. ICs could use the fund to achieve n further units of abatement (and pay for m infra-marginal, 
or “spurious”, units). Total global abatement would be A + n. 
Analogous to the fund, ICs could purchase n + m offsets from developing countries (DCs). This, however, would 
not be a fair comparison. Under the fund, the global abatement equals A + n. Using offsets, global abatement will 
be A – m. The environmental outcome is worse than without offsets (and pc would be lower). To correct this, ICs 
must increase their joint abatement target to A + n + m. This ensures that, after n + m offsets are purchased from 
DCs, the IC mitigation effort is back at A and the pollution price at pc. Global abatement is now also A + n. 4 
 
their forest if the net return from deforesting ri (agricultural plus timber revenues minus clearing 
costs) exceeds any payment pc to maintain forest. Landowner i knows ri with certainty. The 
marginal environmental externality from deforestation is defined as δ.
5 Returns ri are distributed 
across i with density fr
The simplest policy would be to offer a subsidy equal to p
. 
c per plot that remains forested, 
where pc = δ. All landowners with ri ≤ pc will accept the subsidy and not deforest but only 
landowners with 0  ≤  ri ≤ pc will actually change their behavior; landowners with ri > pc will 
(efficiently) deforest. The change in economic surplus ΔSeff
 
 from this efficient policy relative to 
no policy equals 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 =  𝗥𝗥𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = � (𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸 − 𝑟𝑟)
𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸
0
𝐸𝐸 𝑟𝑟(𝑟𝑟)𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟  (1)  
This achieves efficient deforestation but requires a large transfer of resources 
 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟 = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 =  𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟(𝑟𝑟 ≤ 𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸) = 𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸 � 𝐸𝐸 𝑟𝑟(𝑟𝑟)
𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸
−∞
𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟  (2)  
The total amount of avoided deforestation is  
 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸  = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = � 𝐸𝐸 𝑟𝑟(𝑟𝑟)𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟
𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸
0
  (3)  
The payment for each unit of deforestation (PAD) is the ratio TT/AD which will be very 
high if many plots of land have negative returns and so would not have been cleared even 
without the subsidy.   
To avoid large transfers, a second policy option is a voluntary deforestation program that 
will pay participants an amount pc for each hectare of forest exceeding an assigned baseline.
6 




1     𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸 ≤ 0
0     𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸 > 0
   (4)  
If the regulator observes ri, the efficient solution is achieved by assigning each landowner 
i the true baseline BLi(ri). If BLi = 1 (no deforestation), no payment will be made and the forest 
will remain intact. If BLi = 0 (full deforestation) and 0  ≤  ri ≤ pc
                                                 
5 For the purposes of this paper this includes only carbon emissions. More generally it could also include non-
climate externalities, such as loss of biodiversity. 
, the landowner will opt in and 
6 If it were practically feasible, a policy that sets pc = ri would reduce transfers even further. In a recent paper, Mason 
and Plantinga (2010) describe a model in which the regulator has the option to provide landowners with a menu of 
two-part contracts, which consist of a lump-sum payment from the landowner to the regulator and a “per unit of 
forest” back to the landowner. Under certain conditions, these are type-revealing, where an ex-ante unobserved 
“type” corresponds to a marginal opportunity cost curve of keeping a fraction of the land forested. A similar 
approach to maximize the benefits to the developed country funders in an environmental transfer program was 
developed in Kerr, 1995. Our model does not consider this option. Instead, we focus on single baselines and show 
that increased scale can both enhance efficiency and dramatically reduce transfers.  5 
 
choose not to deforest. If BLi = 0 and ri > pc, the landowner will deforest and forego the 
payment pc. If pc
 
 = δ, the remaining deforestation is efficient.  Efficiency and avoided deforestation 
are the same as in (1) and (3) but the total transfer is lower by the amount in (5) and hence the 
payment per unit of deforestation is lower. This policy dominates the subsidy if transfers are 
costly.   
𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸  = 𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸 � 𝐸𝐸 𝑟𝑟(𝑟𝑟)
0
−∞
𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟  (5)  
In practice, however, the regulator cannot observe ri, but instead observes 𝑟𝑟̂𝐸𝐸 = 𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸 + 𝜀𝜀𝐸𝐸. 
The observation error ε has density fε ~ (0, σε), is assumed to be symmetric around 0 and 
independent of fr
 
. The predicted baselines are 
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 �𝐸𝐸 = �
1     𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑟𝑟^𝐸𝐸 ≤ 0
0     𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑟𝑟^𝐸𝐸 > 0
   (6)  
What happens if the government assigns baseline  𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 �𝐸𝐸? When (𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸 > 0,𝑟𝑟̂𝐸𝐸 > 0)  or 
(𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸 ≤ 0,𝑟𝑟̂𝐸𝐸 ≤ 0), the assigned baseline coincides with the true baseline. The landowner will make 
the socially efficient decision. However, if (𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸 > 0,𝑟𝑟̂𝐸𝐸 ≤ 0), the assigned baseline is 1 but the true 
baseline is 0. The landowner would have deforested the plot in the true baseline, but gets 
assigned an unfavorable “no deforestation” baseline. Hence, the landowner will not participate in 
the scheme. This leads to an efficiency loss if 0  ≤  ri ≤ pc
 
 = δ, since the landowner will now 
deforest while he would not have done so had his baseline been correctly assigned and he had 
participated in the scheme. Relative to the efficient outcome in (1) the efficiency loss caused by 
adverse selection equals 






�𝐸𝐸 𝑟𝑟(𝑟𝑟)𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟  (7)  
The amount of avoided deforestation will fall by  
 






𝐸𝐸 𝑟𝑟(𝑟𝑟)𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟  (8)  
Finally, consider the case where (𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸 ≤ 0,𝑟𝑟̂𝐸𝐸 > 0). These landowners would have kept 
their forest, but now get assigned a full deforestation baseline. This will not affect their behavior, 
but it implies an additional infra-marginal transfer pc. The total transfer (TT) is now lower than 
the subsidy amount (2) but higher than in the full information voluntary program. Total transfers 
(TT) are given by the sum of marginal transfers (MT) and infra-marginal transfers (IT). The former are 
the payments made to landowners that change their decision to not deforesting as a result of the 6 
 
policy. The latter are payments to landowners that would not have deforested without the policy, 




𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇 + 𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇












𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟  (9)  
Because the amount of avoided deforestation is reduced relative to both the subsidy and 
the full information voluntary program while the total transfers lie between the two, the effect of 
adverse selection on payment per unit of avoided deforestation is theoretically ambiguous 
relative to the subsidy but clearly higher relative to the full information voluntary program.   
To obtain intuition for this ambiguity, we use the decomposition in (9) to write PAD as 
 
𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸 �1 +










� = 𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸 �1 +
𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
�  (10) 
where IMCF denotes the amount of infra-marginally credited.  Moving from a subsidy to 
a voluntary program reduces IMCF but also lowers AD. For most realistic distributions the 
reduction in IMCF is larger than the reduction in AD, so PAD would fall. The cases described 
above are summarized in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Adverse selection causes efficiency loss in the range 0  ≤  ri ≤ pc = δ. It increases 
transfers in the range ri
 
 ≤ 0. Both are caused by assigning landowners in this range an incorrect 
baseline. 
 
                                                 






regardless of assigned 
baseline
Landowner should not 
deforest, but will if 
assigned baseline equals 1
Landowner will not 
deforest, regardless of 
assigned baseline
Landowner may receive 
payment with no 
behavioral change7 
 
2.2.  The impacts of observation error and returns distributions on policy 
objectives 
The tradeoff between efficiency and transfers depends on the distributions of 
observation errors and returns. We now analyze the impact of each of these on our three policy 
objectives: economic efficiency, avoided deforestation (AD) and payments per hectare of 
avoided deforestation (PAD).  
2.2.1.  Effects of observation error variance  
Equation (7) shows that any change in 𝐸𝐸 𝜀𝜀(𝜀𝜀) that increases the probability mass in the 
range [-∞, -r], where 0 ≤ r ≤ pc, will increase the efficiency loss from adverse selection (assuming 
pc
Under the same assumptions, PAD will increase. This follows from (10). Any increase in 
𝐸𝐸 𝜀𝜀(𝜀𝜀)  that increases the probability mass in the range [-r, ∞], where r ≤ 0, such as an increase in 
𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀 in a normal distribution,  will  increase  IMCF.  Since  AD  decreases,  PAD  rises.  More 
landowners with r
  =  δ)  and decrease avoided deforestation. A mean preserving spread such that 𝐼𝐼 𝜀𝜀
′(𝑥𝑥) ≥
𝐼𝐼 𝜀𝜀(𝑥𝑥) ∀𝑥𝑥 < 0 is sufficient. If the distribution of errors is normal, an increase in variance will 
generate such a mean preserving spread.  
i < 0 will now get assigned 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 �𝐸𝐸 = 0 and receive the payment pc
Numerical illustration.  
, but they do 
not provide additional deforestation.  
To provide more intuition for the results with realistic distributions, we now assume a 
parametric form for the distribution of net agricultural returns fr(r) on forested land and the 
baseline prediction error fε(ε). In the remainder of this paper, we will focus mostly on return 
distributions fr(r) for which Fr
With no shocks, all land with positive returns would be cleared without any policy while 
no land with negative returns will be cleared. Hence, there will be positive probability mass 
below zero and no mass above zero and the assumption trivially holds.  Deforestation occurs 
because the returns distribution shifts over time. If this shift, driven by, for example, technology 
and local infrastructure change, has both a common and an idiosyncratic (e.g. normal unbiased 
(0) > 0.5 and that are downward sloping at 0. The first assumption 
reflects that, at any point in time, landowners have previously chosen not to clear the remaining 
forest so only land on which relative returns have recently risen will still be forested but be at risk 
of clearing. The second assumption implies that there is a higher probability mass for returns just 
below zero than for returns just above zero, which intensifies the tradeoff between efficiency 
and reducing transfers and, in particular, infra-marginal rewards.  8 
 
shock to each plot) element we would still expect the second assumption to hold.
8
We consider f
 The density 
above zero will tend to be lower than below zero, since the tail of the normal distribution implies 
a negative slope.   
r(r) ~ N(-1,1),  fε(ε) ~ N(0, σε) and pc = δ = 0.5 as our central case. Figure 
2 plots the various policy objectives as a function of the standard deviation of the observation 
error σε
Figure 2. Efficiency loss, AD, transfers and PAD as a function of observation error standard 
deviation σ
: the efficiency loss from adverse selection (7) relative to potential efficiency (1), AD, 
transfers and PAD. 
ε (pc
 
 = δ = 0.5). 
 
 
Naturally, the efficiency loss is 0 if the observation error standard deviation σε  = 0. The 
efficiency loss is increasing in σε. As σε  grows large the assignment of baselines becomes 
random. Participation, efficiency and avoided deforestation all fall toward 50% of their maxima 
at σε  = 0. Figure 1 shows that efficiency loss and avoided deforestation only result from 
landowners with 0  ≤  ri
                                                 
8 The common shock will generate a probability mass of forested land above zero return up to the size of the shock; 
the idiosyncratic shock will also move some land to higher returns (and some to lower) leaving lower probability 
mass in the upper tail of the returns distribution. 
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they get assigned 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 �𝐸𝐸 = 1, which happens with probability approaching 0.5 as σε increases. As 
σε increases, infra-marginal transfers rise. Combined, the fall in AD and rise in transfers have 
dramatic implications for PAD; it quickly rises from the efficient value of 0.5 (the environmental 
externality δ ). Even for a fairly modest σε
 This section has shown that a mean preserving spread that increases the tails of the 
observation error distribution (which in a normal distribution would be implied by an increased 
variance) unambiguously has (weakly) negative effects on all three policy objectives. Any 
improvement in our ability to observe returns, or equivalently predict deforestation,  would 
reduce the tradeoff between efficiency and transfers.  This is a challenge for science and 
economics. 
 of 0.3, PAD doubles. 
 
2.3.  The impact of different marginal costs of avoiding deforestation on 
policy objectives 
How do the policy objectives depend on the marginal abatement cost of avoided 
deforestation? In this model, abatement costs are represented by the foregone net return from 
deforestation r and the marginal abatement cost curve depends on the distribution fr
The efficiency gain relative to no policy (1) depends on f
(r).  
r
Figure 3 illustrates this for three different normal returns distributions. As the standard 
deviation σ
(r) through two effects. First, a 
higher probability mass of returns between [0, δ ] increases the efficient level of AD. Second, a 
higher probability mass of very small positive returns between [0, ε << δ] relative to returns 
between [δ - ε, δ] increases efficiency. Therefore, the first condition is not sufficient for an 
overall efficiency gain. 
r grows from 0.5 to 1.0, fr increases for all r between [0, δ]. This increases the 
efficiency gain of the policy. However, when σr increases further from 1.0 to 2.0, fr
 
 increases for 






Figure 3. Returns distributions with µr = -1.0, σr = 0.5, 1.0 and 2.0, and σε
 
 = 0.5. 
 
Proposition 1. If the return distribution shifts from f to f’ such that f’r(r) > fr(r) for all r such that 0 
≤ r ≤ pc
Proof. Since 𝐸𝐸 𝑟𝑟
′(𝑟𝑟) > 𝐸𝐸 𝑟𝑟(𝑟𝑟) ∀𝑟𝑟 ∈ [0,𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸],  
 = δ, ∆S(f’) > ∆S(f). If ∫ 𝐸𝐸 𝑟𝑟
′(𝑟𝑟)
𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸
0 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟 > ∫ 𝐸𝐸 𝑟𝑟(𝑟𝑟)
𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸
0 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟, then AD(f’) > AD(f). 









0 𝐸𝐸 𝑟𝑟(𝑟𝑟)𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝐸𝐸). Since pc
∆𝑆𝑆(𝐸𝐸′) = ∫ (𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸 − 𝑟𝑟)
𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸
0 �∫ 𝐸𝐸 𝜀𝜀(𝜀𝜀)𝑑𝑑𝜀𝜀
∞
−𝑟𝑟 �𝐸𝐸 𝑟𝑟




0 𝐸𝐸 𝑟𝑟(𝑟𝑟)𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟 = ∆𝑆𝑆(𝐸𝐸).  
 – r ≥ 0,  
The second statement is trivial. 
Proposition 1 shows that stronger assumptions on fr and fr
Numerical illustration.  
’ are needed to ensure an 
increase in efficiency than an increase in AD: an increase in the probability mass between [0, δ] is 
sufficient for AD to increase, but not to guarantee increased efficiency. With observation errors, 
a change in the returns distribution also affects the likelihood of infra-marginal payments: a less 
negatively (more positively) sloped  distribution around zero yields lower infra-marginal 
payments. The combined effects on AD and infra-marginal payments determine the effect on 
PAD.    
We now illustrate these effects using our previous numerical example with fr(r) ~ N(-




Case 1: σr = 0.5
Case 2: σr = 1.0




Figure 4. Impact of changing fr(r) on the policy objectives, with pc
 
 = δ = 0.5. 
 
Moving from case 1 to case 2 unambiguously raises efficiency and lowers PAD. This 
follows from Proposition 1, since f ’r(r) > fr
 A shift in the returns distribution that implies consistently lower marginal abatement 
costs in the relevant price range and reduces the density of returns just below zero relative to 
those above zero in the relevant price range will improve efficiency and reduce PAD. This might 
potentially be achieved by policies complementary to the voluntary program that address 
information failures or non-carbon externalities and hence increase the attractiveness of keeping 
land forested (e.g. for tourism, or a sustainable form of selective logging).  
(r) for all r between [0, δ]. It corresponds to a 
downward movement in the marginal cost curve. In contrast, moving from case 2 to case 3, 
efficiency falls slightly; PAD does also. The probability mass of returns between [0, δ] decreases 
slightly, limiting the potential efficiency gains and AD. The distribution becomes almost flat in 
the region [0, δ]. This means that the density close to zero (where costs are low) falls relative to 
the density close to δ (where costs are high). The marginal cost curve moves in such a way that 
less deforestation is avoided at a higher average cost. This flatness however also means that the 
ratio of land with returns at risk of infra-marginal payments (r just below 0) to returns with 
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3. The Impact of Policy Choices 
3.1.  Policy 1: increasing the project scale 
A first policy to consider is to increase the scale of each  project. So far, we have 
considered a small-scale policy in which landowners get assigned plot-specific baselines and can 
opt in separately with each individual plot. While some forest carbon programs in practice are 
indeed small-scale, other proposals feature baselines for larger areas (e.g., a region or a country).
9
3.1.1.  A multiple-plot model 
 
Section 2 showed that observation errors in voluntary programs reduce efficiency and avoided 
deforestation and increase payments per hectare of forest saved. This section shows that 
increasing the required scale of each project in the program mitigates these adverse 
consequences. 
We now consider a single landowner (alternatively, a region or country) who controls n 
1-hectare plots. Each plot j has a return from deforestation rj. We initially assume that these 
returns are distributed i.i.d. over plots with density fr. Without the program, the landowner will 
clear all plots for which the return rj
 
 exceeds zero. Hence, the true baseline is 




1     𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑟𝑟 𝑗𝑗 ≤ 0
0     𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑟𝑟 𝑗𝑗 > 0
   (11)  
The government observes each rj with error εj: 𝑟𝑟̂𝑗𝑗 = 𝑟𝑟 𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗. Assume that ε  j is i.i.d. 
across  j. This means that  𝑟𝑟̂𝑗𝑗  has a distribution with mean µr  and variance σr
2  +  σε
2.  The 
distribution  of  𝑟𝑟̂𝑗𝑗  is more dispersed than fr(r). The government could compute an unbiased 
prediction of the baseline 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 �𝐸𝐸 as the sum of the expectation of the random variables for the 
plot-specific baselines. From its point of view, the true baseline for a specific plot is a Bernoulli 
random variable with mean p1i and variance p1i*(1 – p1i), where p1i = Pr(rj < 0|𝑟𝑟̂𝑗𝑗) = Pr(BLj = 
1|𝑟𝑟̂𝑗𝑗).
10
                                                 
9 The Costa Rican Payments for Ecosystems services program is an example of a small scale system.  Norway’s recent agreement with Guyana sets up a large scale system. 
 Since these are non-identically but independently distributed across j, the central limit 
theorem yields that for n → ∞ 
10 Note that p1i ≠ Pr(𝑟𝑟̂ 𝑗𝑗 < 0), except if fr(r) is symmetric around zero. If the government naively assumed that r and 𝑟𝑟̂ 
have the same distribution, it would calculate p1i = Fε(-𝑟𝑟̂ 𝑗𝑗) = (if fε is symmetric) 1 – Fε(𝑟𝑟̂ 𝑗𝑗). This would lead to a biased 
estimate of the baseline. 13 
 
 











  (12)  
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 �𝐸𝐸 is a continuous baseline for all n plots.
11
3.1.2.  Increasing scale and efficiency 
 The landowner must now decide whether 
or not to opt in with his entire forest area, or not participate.  
This section presents numerical simulations that show that a larger scale improves 
efficiency for “reasonable” returns distributions. In general, however, increasing the project scale 
has countervailing impacts on efficiency. The overall effect is ambiguous. Figure 5 provides 
intuition. 
 
Figure 5. Single versus multiple plot policy. 
 
 
Figure 5 contrasts the single plot with the multiple plot case. In the single plot case, an 
inefficiency occurs when the true baseline is 0, but the government assigns a baseline of 1. In the 
multi-plot case, assigning a more favorable baseline �𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 �𝐸𝐸 < 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸� will lead to guaranteed opt-in 
and infra-marginal payments. However, if 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 �𝐸𝐸 > 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸, the landowner has two options. If he 
opts in, he will clear all plots with returns exceeding pc
                                                 
11 The baseline per plot will tend toward the true baseline and the observation error will tend toward zero per plot. 




Efficiency loss if true 
baseline = 0 (rj> 0)
Infra-marginal transfer if 
true baseline = 1 (rj< 0)
n








𝑟𝑟̂𝑗𝑗 > 0       𝑟𝑟̂𝑗𝑗 < 0        𝑟𝑟̂1,…,𝑟𝑟̂𝐸𝐸 
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returns between 0 and pc. Let npc be the number of plots with r < pc
 
. Hence, opting in is favorable 
if and only if 




Hence, for some assigned baselines 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 �𝐸𝐸, the landowner will still opt in, but for assigned 
baselines exceeding a threshold value, the landowner will opt out with all of his n plots. For this 
reason, the effect of increasing scale on efficiency is not a priori clear. There are cases in which 
scale increases efficiency: even if the baseline is too stringent, the landowner may still opt in with 
all n plots. Hence, all plots with returns between 0 and pc will remain forested. This leads to a 
higher efficiency gain than plot-specific baselines, in which some plots with returns between 0 
and pc
However, in some cases the efficiency of the new system is lower than with plot-specific 
baselines. This happens when the baseline is so unfavorable that the landowners opt out with all n 
plots. In the single plot program, some critical plots with returns between 0 and p
 will get assigned a baseline equal to 1, and opt out.  
c
Comparing the overall efficiency gain from scaling up is not straightforward analytically. 
Figure 6 illustrates this for n = 2. With single-plot baselines, the expected efficiency gain relative 
to no policy is simply 2∆S with ∆S defined in (1) minus (7). Now consider a 2-plot baseline. The 
assigned baseline 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 �2 ∈ {0,1,2}. Figure 6 shows under what circumstances this policy yields an 
efficiency gain relative to no policy. 
 will receive a 
correct baseline and some deforestation will be efficiently avoided. 






No efficiency change No efficiency change
Efficiency gain if BL2^ = 0 or 1
Efficiency gain if BL2^ = 0 or 1
Efficiency gain if BL2^ = 0
Efficiency gain if BL2^ = 0
No efficiency change
Efficiency gain 
if BL2^ = 0
Efficiency gain 






The horizontal axis indicates the return of the first plot (rj=1), and the vertical axis the 
(independently distributed) return of the second plot (rj=2). We focus on the region in which 
there is a potential efficiency gain: either rj=1, or rj=2, or both returns are between 0 and pc. In area 
A, the true baseline BL2 = 1. With single-plot baselines, the efficiency gain would materialize 
only the assigned baseline for the second plot �𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 �𝑗𝑗=2� was correct. However, the efficiency gain 
will now also occur if the 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 �𝑗𝑗=2 = 1 (incorrect) but 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 �𝑗𝑗=1 = 0 (incorrect), so that 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 �2 = 1 
(correct). Hence, errors in different directions may cancel each other. The same holds for area B. 
In area C, the full efficiency gain would materialize in a single-plot program only if 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 �𝑗𝑗=1 =
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 �𝑗𝑗=2 = 0. With a 2-plot program, the full gain is realized if the baseline is correct �𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 �2 = 0�, 
but also if �𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 �2 = 1�. This follows since (13) holds if rj=1 + rj=2 < pc
There is a flip side to this additional efficiency gain, represented by the light grey shaded 
regions. First, area D represents a region in which the full efficiency gain (relative to no policy) is 
realized only if 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 �2 = 0. When 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 �2 = 1, the landowner will opt out with all plots since (13) does 
not hold. In a single-plot program one of the plots may have been assigned 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 �𝑗𝑗 = 0 and an 
efficiency gain (relative to no policy) would have been realized. Similar arguments hold for 
regions E and F.  
. This is an additional 
efficiency gain relative to a single-plot program. Hence, the dark grey shaded regions indicate 
combinations of returns for which a multi-plot program is more efficient than a single-plot 
program. 
Hence, to calculate if a multi-plot program constitutes an efficiency gain relative to a 
single-plot program, we need to compute the relative importance of the dark grey versus the light 
grey regions in Figure 6. Proposition 2 shows that the result is ambiguous and depends on the 
probability distributions fr and fε
Proposition 2. Even if f
. 
r and fε are both symmetric and i.i.d. with mean 0, and fr and fε
Proof. See Appendix 1.
 are 
independent, 2-plot baselines are not always more efficient than single-plot baselines. 
12
A proof for the efficiency of an n-plot program is analytically difficult, but the next 
section presents numerical simulations to investigate the implications for realistic distributions. 
  
                                                 
12 Analogous to the proof of Proposition 2, 2-plot baselines do not always lead to higher AD than single-plot 
baselines. The impact of scale on PAD is also ambiguous. 16 
 
3.1.3.  Numerical simulations of increased scale 
This section presents numerical simulations to illustrate the differences between a single-
plot versus multiple plot program.  Throughout this section, we assume a normal observation 
error distribution with σε = 0.5, unbiased assigned baselines, and pc = δ = 0.5. The central case 
returns distribution is fr(r) ~ N(-1,1).  We also consider alternative distributions.
13 In all cases, 
fε
 
(ε) ~ N(0,0.5). Table 1 demonstrates what happens to the policy objectives as n increases.  
Table 1. The impact of increasing the required project scale: fr
 
(r) ~ N(-1,1).   
1-plot  2-plot  10-plot  100-plot  Maximum 
potential σε
∆ efficiency 
 = 0 
1.3331  1.4157  1.8248  2.4744  2.5319 
AD  5.3387  5.5368  6.5951  8.9545  9.1848 
TT  4.8817  4.8158  4.5139  4.5562  4.5924 
PAD  0.9149  0.8702  0.6845  0.5089  0.5000 
Opt in  4.88%  18.30%  58.42%  97.47%  100% 
Notes: Each row is based on 10,000 random draws from the probability distributions. δ = 
pc = 0.5. fε
 
(ε) ~ N(0,0.5). ∆efficiency, AD and TT are all normalized per 100 plots. Assigned 
baselines are unbiased. 
Table 1 shows  that increasing the project scale has dramatic consequences for its 
performance. For the central case, n-plot baselines increase efficiency and AD and reduce PAD 
as n increases. 100 plots are enough to approach the efficient solution. The reason is that the 
observation error normalized per plot decreases as n grows, and the probability of opt-in becomes 
very high (97.47%).
14
We now test the robustness of these conclusions. An important assumption has been 
that f
 This high opt-in rate signals efficiency though Table 1 shows that most 
gains are achieved through the first 5% of plots that participate. Hence, scale mitigates adverse 
selection for the central case returns distribution. Appendix 2 demonstrates that, as discussed in 
Section 3.1.2, this result does not hold for all distributions. 
r(r) and fε
                                                 
13 In addition to the central case returns distribution, we consider fr(r) ~ N(0,1) and fr(r) ~ symmetric bimodal 
normal with modes -0.5 and 0.5, and standard deviation 0.1. Results for these are given in Appendix 2. 
(ε) are i.i.d: both returns and observation errors are independent across plots. In 
reality, there may be a high degree of spatial correlation in both returns and errors. We introduce 
spatial correlation across plots in the following stylized way: 
14 In some realizations, landowners efficiently opt out: their return exceeds δ. 17 
 
  𝑟𝑟 𝑗𝑗 = 𝜌𝜌𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑗𝑗−1 + 𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟
𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗 = 𝜌𝜌𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗−1 + 𝑅𝑅𝜀𝜀
  (14)  
where ur and uε are i.i.d. with variances σur
2 and σuε
2, such that σr
2 = σur




2 / (1 – ρε
2
 
). Table 2 summarizes the main findings for the central case. Results for 
other distributions are given in Appendix 2. 
Table 2. The impact of spatially correlated returns and observation errors: n = 1 and n = 100. 
fr
 











 = 0 
  ρr = 0, 
ρε
ρ
 = 0 
r = 0.5, 
ρε
ρ
 = 0.5 
r = 0.9, 
ρε
ρ
 = 0.9 





∆efficiency  1.3331  2.4744  2.4130  2.0204  1.5901  2.5319 
AD  5.3387  8.9545  8.7245  7.2744  5.7233  9.1848 
TT  4.8817  4.5562  4.5228  4.4151  4.5881  4.5924 
PAD  0.9149  0.5089  0.5184  0.6070  0.8024  0.5000 
Opt in   4.88%  97.47%  94.96%  78.40%  37.28%  100% 
Notes: Each row is based on 10,000 random draws from the probability distributions δ = pc = 0.5. fε
 
(ε) ~ 
N(0,0.5). Δefficiency, AD and TT are all normalized per 100 plots. Assigned baselines are unbiased. 
Table 2 shows that only very high spatial correlation (ρ ≥ 0.9) undermines the effect of 
increasing scale. As the correlation across plots and errors increases, efficiency and AD decrease, 
and PAD increases. The intuition is that observation errors do not cancel out across plots, but 
are persistent. High spatial correlation reduces the probability of participation and therefore 
adversely impacts the policy objectives. Larger required project scale would mitigate this. 
 
3.2.  Policy 2: choosing a different payment per hectare 
In the analysis above, the  payment per hectare pc  was assumed to be equal to the 
marginal externality from deforestation δ. This section analyzes what happens to the three 
project objectives if we vary pc. Reducing pc is equivalent to the practice of “credit discounting” 
sometimes observed in practice in offset systems (Kollmuss et al., 2010). Under a system of 
discounting, fewer offset credits are awarded than the environmental gains represented by the 
difference between the baseline and the actual forest level. First, we discuss the impact of 18 
 
changing pc
It is straightforward to see that, independent of scale any p
 in a single-plot model. Then, we analyze how these results change in a multiple-plot 
model using numerical simulations.  
c ≠ δ  is less efficient if σε = 0. 
All landowners get assigned the true baseline, and paying less than δ  reduces efficiency, because 
landowners with average returns ((r |0 ≤  r ≤ δ ) > pc) would opt out. Paying more than δ  
reduces efficiency because some landowners will opt in even though their private gains from 
deforestation exceed the full environmental cost. This is inefficient from an economic 
perspective.
15  In the single-plot model with full and symmetric information, the change in 
efficiency relative to a no policy case was given in (1). A simple application of Leibniz’ Rule 
yields that efficiency is maximized when pc = δ . We will now investigate if this result changes 
with asymmetric information – i.e. when σε 
3.2.1.  Different payments in the single-plot model 
> 0. 
In the single-plot model, the introduction of observation error does not change the 
conclusion that the most efficient payment is pc
 
 = δ. The efficiency change relative to no policy 
equals 






�𝐸𝐸 𝑟𝑟(𝑟𝑟)𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟  (15)  
Proposition 3. In the single-plot model, efficiency is maximized for pc = δ, regardless of fε




(𝗿𝗿 − 𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸)�∫ 𝐸𝐸 𝜀𝜀(𝜀𝜀)𝑑𝑑𝜀𝜀
∞
−𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸 �𝐸𝐸 𝑟𝑟(𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸). Since ∫ 𝐸𝐸 𝜀𝜀(𝜀𝜀)𝑑𝑑𝜀𝜀
∞
−𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸 > 0  for any 𝐸𝐸 𝜀𝜀(𝜀𝜀)  and  𝐸𝐸 𝑟𝑟(𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸) ≥ 0, 
efficiency is maximized when p
(ε). 
c
We now investigate what happens to the other two project objectives as the payment p
 = δ.  
c
Proposition 4. Avoided deforestation is (weakly) increasing in p
 varies. 
c.  MT, IT  and TT  are globally 
(weakly) increasing in pc
                                                 
15 This is not a statement that current payments should not be increased. If current payments are considerably below 
the true environmental externality, more deforestation should be avoided from an economic perspective.  
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0 𝐸𝐸 𝑟𝑟(𝑟𝑟)𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟. The derivative of AD  w.r.t.  pc  is 
�∫ 𝐸𝐸 𝜀𝜀(𝜀𝜀)𝑑𝑑𝜀𝜀
∞
−𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸 �𝐸𝐸 𝑟𝑟(𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸) ≥ 0 ∀𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸, proving the first statement. The derivative of MT (first term in 




0 𝐸𝐸 𝑟𝑟(𝑟𝑟)𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟 + 𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸 �∫ 𝐸𝐸 𝜀𝜀(𝜀𝜀)𝑑𝑑𝜀𝜀
∞
−𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸 �𝐸𝐸 𝑟𝑟(𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸) ≥ 0 ∀𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸. The derivative 




−∞ 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟 ≥ 0 ∀𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸. Hence, the derivative 
of TT w.r.t. pc
The effect of changing p
 is weakly greater than zero ∀𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸.   
c on PAD is ambiguous. To get some intuition for why this is 
the case, consider (10). IMCF denotes the amount of infra-marginally credited forest (which is 
independent of pc). Avoided deforestation AD is increasing in pc. Since AD is bounded, very 
high values of pc will lead to increasing PAD. For intermediate values of pc, a small increase in pc 
can either lead to almost no additional deforestation, or a large increase in avoided deforestation, 
depending on the specification of the return distribution fr(r). For instance, if fr(r) = 0 for 
𝑟𝑟 ∈ [0,𝑝𝑝], then PAD will be infinite for pc ≤ p and achieve a global minimum for some pc > p. 
Hence, PAD can either be increasing or decreasing in pc.
16
We conclude that, in the single-plot model, efficiency is maximized by paying p
  
c = δ.  
Paying more leads to more AD, but requires higher transfers. The effect on PAD is ambiguous 
for low values of pc
3.2.2.  Different payments in the multi-plot model 
, but eventually PAD must increase.  
In the multi-plot model, pc = δ no longer unambiguously maximizes efficiency. The 
intuition is as follows. Raising pc above δ has two countervailing effects on efficiency. First, it will 
increase the opt-in probability. This increases efficiency because it helps prevent deforestation of 
plots with returns below δ. Second, it causes certain forest to be inefficiently prevented from 
deforestation. The relative strength of these channels determines whether a higher pc can be 
more efficient than pc = δ. A lower pc will never increase efficiency, since it will both reduce opt-
in and cause inefficient deforestation. The effects go in the same direction. Hence, pc  ≥  δ 
maximizes efficiency in the multiple-plot model. PAD is ambiguous in pc
Table 3 shows that raising p
. Table 3 illustrates this 
when δ = 0.5 and n = 10 or 100. 
c above δ can increase efficiency. For n = 10, raising pc above 
δ (to pc = 0.6) slightly increases efficiency. Hence, efficiency is no longer maximized at pc = 
δ. However, when n = 100, the opt-in probability at pc
                                                 
16 Proof available from the authors on request. 
 = δ  is already almost efficient at 97.47%. 20 
 
Raising pc to 0.6 increases opt-in only slightly to 98.93%. Hence, we find that the most efficient 
solution is sometimes achieved for pc
 
 > δ. This increased efficiency coincides with higher PAD, 
however. 
Table 3. The impact of changing pc, for fr
 
(r) ~ N(-1,1), δ = 0.5 for n = 10 and 100. 
  carbon payments (pc
 
) 
n  0.1   0.25  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.75  1.0 
∆efficiency  10  0.5290  1.2046  1.6650  1.8248  1.8754  1.7787  1.2991 
  100  0.6751  1.6996  2.3279  2.4744  2.4496  2.2171  1.5886 
                 
AD  10  1.1723  3.1523  5.2428  6.5951  7.8780  9.6013  11.7763 
  100  1.4928  4.4394  7.3462  8.9545  10.2858  11.8285  13.5757 
                 
TT  10  0.4282  1.5186  3.1517  4.5139  6.0625  8.6547  13.3455 
  100  0.2541  1.2716  3.0522  4.5562  6.2118  8.8767  13.5741 
                 
PAD  10  0.3655  0.4819  0.6012  0.6845  0.7696  0.9015  1.1333 
  100  0.1703  0.2865  0.4155  0.5089  0.6039  0.7505  0.9999 
                 
Opt-in  10  33.59%  44.25%  53.26%  58.42%  62.83%  68.19%  74.29% 
  100  63.39%  84.16%  94.43%  97.47%  98.93%  99.74%  99.97% 
Notes: Each row is based on 10,000 random draws from the probability distributions. δ = pc = 
0.5. fε
 
(ε) ~ N(0,0.5). Δefficiency, AD and TT are all normalized per 100 plots. Assigned baselines 
are unbiased.  
In summary, we find that efficiency considerations never justify setting the payment pc 
below the environmental damage δ, and setting pc > δ can be justified if opt-in at pc = δ is below 
100%. Since increasing scale leads to full opt-in in the limit, pc = δ always becomes the most 
efficient payment as n approaches infinity. There always exists a p’ (p’ > δ) such that efficiency 
falls and transfers rise for any p > p’. In that price region, the outcome is unambiguously worse. 
For choices pc
 
 < δ, the tradeoff between efficiency and transfers remains. 21 
 
3.3.  Policy 3: changing the generosity of the assigned baseline 
Another policy choice for the regulator is to set a baseline that is, in expectation, too high 
or too low. In other words, the government assigns the following baselines for plot i 
 
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 �𝐸𝐸 = �
1     𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑟𝑟^𝐸𝐸 ≤ 𝑟𝑟∗
0     𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑟𝑟^𝐸𝐸 > 𝑟𝑟∗   (16)  
where r* is a specified return set by the government. The government, aware of adverse 
selection, may try to only pay landowners who are most likely to deforest in the baseline, by 
choosing pc > r* > 0. Assuming pc
3.3.1.  Changing baselines in the single-plot model 
 = δ,  we analyze the impact of this policy change on the three 
criteria: efficiency, AD and PAD. To provide intuition, we first discuss the impact in the context 
of the single-plot model. Then, we present numerical simulations of the multiple-plot model.  
Proposition 5. More generous baselines increase efficiency and AD, but require a higher TT.  
Proof.  The efficiency change relative to no policy equals 
∆𝑆𝑆(𝑟𝑟∗) = ∫ (𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸 − 𝑟𝑟)
𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸
0 �∫ 𝐸𝐸 𝜀𝜀(𝜀𝜀)𝑑𝑑𝜀𝜀
∞
𝑟𝑟∗−𝑟𝑟 �𝐸𝐸 𝑟𝑟(𝑟𝑟)𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟. By Leibniz’ Rule, this expression is globally 
weakly decreasing in r*. Hence, efficiency is maximized if 𝑟𝑟∗ → −∞. AD is given by 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝑟𝑟∗) =




0 𝐸𝐸 𝑟𝑟(𝑟𝑟)𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟, which is globally weakly decreasing in 




−∞ 𝐸𝐸 𝑟𝑟(𝑟𝑟)𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟, which is also globally 
weakly decreasing in r*.  
The fact that efficiency increases as 𝑟𝑟∗ → −∞ is not surprising, since this is equivalent to 
assigning a no-forest baseline or a subsidy of pc
Using (10) and making IMCF and AD functions of r* we can see that the effect of r* on 
PAD is ambiguous. IMCF, the amount of infra-marginally credited forest, is decreasing in r*, but 
so is AD. The shape of PAD is dependent on the return distribution f
 per hectare of forest standing. As discussed in 









Numerical illustration.  
Figure 7. Impact of baseline generosity on the project objectives for the central case. 
 
 
Figure 7 confirms that efficiency, AD  and  TT  are decreasing in r*. For “typical” returns 
distributions like our central case (fr
3.3.2.  Changing baselines in the multiple-plot model 
(r)~N(-1,1)), PAD is also decreasing in r*. Hence, efficiency 
and PAD are generally conflicting policy aims for this policy option also: efficiency requires 
setting r* low, while minimizing PAD requires setting r* high.  
The conclusions from the single-plot model also hold in the multiple-plot model. Table 4 
illustrates the effect of assigning baselines that are too (un)favorable in expectation for the 
central case returns distribution.  
Table 4. The impact of changing baseline generosity, for fr
 
(r) ~ N(-1,1) and n = 100. 
expected assigned baseline (𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 �100) 
  78  81  84 (unbiased)  87  90  93 
∆efficiency  2.5264  2.5255  2.4744  2.0324  0.8671  0.0850 
AD  9.1723  9.1526  8.9545  7.2768  3.0144  0.2798 
TT  7.5860  6.0750  4.5562  2.7654  0.9043  0.0695 
PAD  0.8271  0.6638  0.5089  0.3801  0.3001  0.2483 
Opt-in  100.00%  99.85%  97.47%  79.64%  34.18%  3.54% 
Notes: Each row is based on 10,000 random draws from the probability distributions. δ = pc = 0.5. σε
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In Table 4, the true baseline equals 84 (84 out of 100 plots will remain forested in 
absence of a policy). The table shows that increasing the baseline (i.e., making it less favorable) 
unambiguously reduces efficiency, AD, and opt-in probability, but also reduces  PAD. This 
illustrates the conflicting policy objectives: achieving efficiency and avoiding deforestation comes 
at the expense of increased transfers for both single and multiple-plot programs.  
This section has shown that only increasing project scale improves all objectives 
simultaneously (for “typical” returns distributions). Discounting credits and changing baseline 
generosity affect the objectives in opposing directions. This raises the question about how these 
objectives should be weighed against each other. In other words: what is the optimal 
deforestation policy? This question is addressed in the next section. 
 
4. Choosing an Optimal Policy 
The previous sections have illustrated that deforestation policies involve trade-offs 
between environmental  outcomes, financial transfers and efficiency. This section provides a 
framework for how decision makers can optimally trade off these outcomes and then simulates 
the effects of different policy choices.  
4.1.  A framework for ‘optimal’ decision making 
The optimal policy depends on whose interests are considered. A global social planner, 
who can require participation and faces no costs of transfers, could maximize efficiency and then 
redistribute the surplus to meet distributional (and political) objectives.
17  This is a useful 
benchmark, which we refer as the “globally efficient policy”. However, in an international 
context, both the industrialized countries (ICs) that fund the policy and developing countries 
(DCs) that avoid deforestation must participate voluntarily. Our basic policy design ensures that 
the developing country participation constraint is met. We must now consider the participation 
constraint for the ICs. If we design a policy to maximize the surplus of the ICs subject to 
voluntary participation by DCs (so they more than meet their participation constraint) we will 
find a set of Pareto optimal policies.
18
                                                 
17 This is closer to a model of domestic regulatory design and implicitly assumes a utilitarian social welfare function. 
 As long as there is a global aggregate surplus from the 
policy, the stakeholders should in theory be able to negotiate a sharing rule for the surplus and all 
be better off with than without the policy. 
18 If we allowed for policies that induce full revelation of landowners’ information we could potentially expand this 
set.  We are not convinced that these are empirically feasible and even if they were, they seem likely to be difficult to 
implement internationally. 24 
 
As discussed in Section 1, under assumptions we maintain in this paper, including 
avoided deforestation in a cap and trade system and rewarding it through an international fund 
are equivalent. However, when considering the cost of transferring resources between countries 
the systems could differ. ICs might be more likely to raise resources for a fund through 
distortionary taxation, while reductions under cap and trade might be an obligation placed 
directly on companies (implicitly a lump sum cost). However, given the politics of free allocation 
with cap and trade systems, the marginal resources for either could come from additional taxes 
or through reduced free allocation. From the DC point of view both approaches provide useful 
government revenue though they could be perceived differently.  Thus without loss of generality 
we will present the optimal policy in terms of an international fund.  
The fund is used to pay DCs that opt into the program. They receive pc per hectare, 
which leads to n hectares of avoided deforestation and m units of infra-marginal forest receiving 
payments. They value each dollar received at its face value. DCs forego returns rj on each of the 
n hectares of avoided deforestation. We assume that the global environmental gain δ is fully 
valued by ICs, and is not valued by DCs.
19 Payments are directly costly to ICs. In addition, 
transferring resources is associated with an additional cost or benefit of γ. If γ = 0, a one dollar 
transfer has a cost to ICs of exactly one dollar. Alternatively, γ > 0 refers to a situation in which 
distortionary taxes need to raise money for the fund or the IC has an aversion to paying for 
abatement in a DC relative to in their own country at the same cost. A third possibility is that γ 
< 0. Rich ICs may derive satisfaction from donating funds to poor DCs or may feel a sense of 
responsibility to cover a higher share of the costs of international climate mitigation.
20
Under these assumptions, the costs and benefits to the different countries are 
 
 
𝐺𝐺𝑔𝑔𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡:   𝐸𝐸�







= 𝐸𝐸(𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸 − 𝐸𝐸[𝑟𝑟|0 ≤ 𝑟𝑟 ≤ 𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸]) + 𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸 
(17)  
 
                                                 
19 In reality, some of the environmental benefits accrue to DCs, whose governments may or may not value them. If 
they are valued by DC governments, it should lead to intervention even without an IC-induced policy. This shifts 
the baseline upwards. This would be an easy adjustment in our model, and would not affect the qualitative results. 
20 Note that from the perspective of the global social planner, γ = 0 implies costless transfers from ICs to DCs. This 
case corresponds to the “globally efficient policy”, which is effectively a pure subsidy on forest standing. Even when 
transfers are costly to the DC (γ > 0), we assume that the global social planner could do costless lump-sum transfers 
without any distortionary effects. The case γ < 0 is more subtle. In principle, a global social planner would want to 
do an unlimited amount of redistribution from ICs to DCs, even beyond the full forest subsidy. To limit transfers, 
we must assume that γ is rising in the scale of transfer, possibly responding to the income difference between the 
groups or a limited “warm glow” effect of donations. We abstract from this issue and will continue to compare any 
feasible solutions to the same “globally efficient policy” as for γ ≥ 0.  25 
 
  𝐺𝐺𝑔𝑔𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡:   𝗿𝗿𝐸𝐸 − 𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸(𝐸𝐸 + 𝑚𝑚)(1 + 𝗾𝗾)  (18)  
 
  𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇 𝑔𝑔𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑇𝑇 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 𝑤𝑤𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇ℎ 𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑔𝑔𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸 𝑤𝑤𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡: 
𝐸𝐸(𝗿𝗿 − 𝐸𝐸[𝑟𝑟|0 ≤ 𝑟𝑟 ≤ 𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸]) − 𝗾𝗾𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸(𝐸𝐸 + 𝑚𝑚) 
(19)  
This specification of surplus combines the policy objectives discussed in previous 
sections: efficiency is captured by the first terms of the gains to DCs and ICs, AD corresponds 
to n, total transfers are included in the second term in the gains to ICs and m is equal to IMCF 
which affects PAD. Hence, this framework represents a method to balance the project objectives 
optimally. 
As discussed in footnote 19, a global social planner will choose the efficient solution 
based on costless transfers (γ = 0) and then reallocate resources. The actual net global gains when 
transfers are costly/beneficial (γ ≠ 0) are given in (19) and differ from the globally efficient 
policy. When the IC participation constraint (equation (18) ≥ 0) is added so that the gains to ICs 
must be non-negative, we can compute a set of feasible (individually rational) policies. Our model 
does not predict which feasible policy will be chosen, except that the policy must be Pareto 
efficient. The set of feasible policies does not necessarily contain the globally efficient policy. 
Equation (18) shows that if m, γ > 0, setting pc = δ will never lead to IC participation.
21 Any such 
policy would imply negative gains to ICs. Two options could induce IC participation. First, 
credits could be discounted (pc
 
 < δ). Second, the baseline could be set stringent enough to 
achieve m < 0. Both will reduce efficiency.  If γ is negative for less than some level of transfer, 
implying that ICs derive some satisfaction from transferring money to DCs, there will be less 
need to discount credits or require stringent baselines to meet the ICs’ participation constraint 
and the loss of efficiency is reduced.  
4.2.  Numerical simulations of optimal policy choices 
In this section, we use the numerical simulations to determine the optimal policy, both 
from the global planner’s and the IC-DCs’ perspectives. Initially we assume that γ = 0. Using our 
earlier notation, the IC participation constraint is now simply δAD – TT ≥ 0. We assume that 
the policy will be a multiple-plot program (n = 100; subscript dropped below), since large scale 
                                                 
21 If γ = 0, pc = δ and m = 0 (e.g., if σε = 0 and the assigned baseline is unbiased), ICs are indifferent about 
participation. 26 
 
programs dominate small scale programs (Section 3). There are two policy levers: reducing pc
Section 3 presented simulation results in which these two policy levers were varied 
separately (Tables 3-4). Table 3 shows the impact of changing p
 
relative to δ and biasing downwards the assigned baseline �𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 �� relative to its expected value. 
c, while 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 � is unbiased and fixed 
at 84.
22 Figure 8 below shows the change in global surplus ∆Sglobal (=∆efficiency), as well as the 
change in surplus for ICs (∆SIC = δAD - TT) and for DCs (∆SDC = ∆Sglobal - ∆SIC
 
).  
Figure 8. Surplus for ICs, DCs and the world at various payments pc, for fr
 
(r) ~ N(-1,1), δ = 0.5, 
γ = 0, n = 100 and 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 � = 84. 
 
As discussed above, the global planner’s optimal policy maximizes global efficiency. 
Hence, the optimal policy from a global planner’s perspective would be to set pc = δ = 0.5. This 
increases global efficiency by 2.4744 (per 100 plots). However, ICs would not choose to 
participate in this program. ICs are worse off by 0.0790 (while DCs gain 2.5534). We must 
restrict ourselves to policies for which δAD - TT ≥ 0. This means that pc must be reduced below 
δ. The surplus-maximizing choice for ICs is pc = 0.25. DCs also gain (as long as pc
                                                 
22 In fact, pc in the simulations varies from 0.05 to 1, in steps of 0.05. 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 � varies from 78 to 93, in steps of 1. A finer 
grid level would result in a large computation time. 
 > 0). The 
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Since ∆SDC is increasing in pc, any policy with pc between 0.25 and 0.48 (the price at which ∆SIC 
= 0) is possible.
23 We rule out policies with pc
This could create a theoretical underpinning for the use of discounting as proposed by 
policy makers. But there is a second policy lever: Figure 9 shows the impact of changing the 
baseline generosity on global, IC and DC surplus (fixing p
 < 0.25 since they are Pareto dominated. 
c
 
 = 0.5). 
Figure 9. Surplus for ICs, DCs and the world at various assigned baselines 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 �, for fr(r) ~ N(-
1,1), pc
 
 = δ = 0.5, γ = 0 and n = 100.  
 
Figure 9 shows that while the global planner’s optimal policy would set the baseline as 
generously as possible, ICs will not choose to participate. In fact, the set of policies that meet the 
participation constraints and are Pareto optimal consists of 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 � between 84.25 (the baseline at 
which ∆SIC
Figures 8 and 9 demonstrate that if γ = 0 any policy that ICs will choose to participate in 
must either involve credit discounting, or setting more stringent than unbiased baselines, or 
both. It is not straightforward which option should be preferred. On one extreme, policies that 
leave the ICs indifferent about participating (p
 = 0) and 88. Again, the final outcome depends on bargaining power. 
c
                                                 
23 When the project scale is constrained to n = 10, the planner’s efficiency maximizing choice would be pc = 0.6 > δ. 
The feasible individually rational set of policies restricts pc to between 0.10 and 0.26. 
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DCs. On the other extreme, ICs can extract more surplus by setting pc = 0.25 than by setting 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 � 
= 88.
24
A third potential policy combines changing baselines and discounting credits. Figure 10 
shows contour plots of the surplus for ICs, DCs and the world, when p
 
c
Figure 10. Contour plots of the surplus for ICs, DCs and the world at various baselines 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 �, for 
γ = 0, f
 varies between 0 and 
0.65, and 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 � between 82 and 92. 
r(r) ~ N(-1,1), n = 100, at various combinations of (pc
 
, 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 �).  
 
Figure 10 indicates that global surplus is decreasing in 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 � and increasing when pc tends 
towards δ (lower left panel). DCs’ surplus is decreasing in 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 � and increasing in pc (upper right 
panel). However, the ICs’ optimal choice would be (pc, 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 �) = (0.35, 86) (upper left panel): a 
combination of credit discounting and a more stringent than unbiased baseline would be optimal 
from the ICs’ perspective. The intuition is that a slight change from pc = δ  to pc
                                                 
24 This could suggest that DCs would be well advised to negotiate on the basis of less generous baselines rather than 
accepting discounted prices. 




































































































































marginally reduces all payments for those who opt in, while the change in the opt in probability 
and the efficiency loss from deforesting plots with returns between δ - ε and δ is small. Similarly, 
a slight increase in the assigned baseline leads to first order infra-marginal gains but only second-
order losses. Hence, we conclude that there is a potential economic rationale for the 
simultaneous use of discounting and being strict with baselines. 
As discussed above, which policy gets implemented ultimately depends on the relative 
bargaining positions of ICs and DCs. We imposed two constraints: (1) no party can lose relative 
to no policy, and (2) a policy cannot be Pareto dominated. The lower right panel shows this 
“conditional Pareto set”. The vertical and horizontal dotted lines indicate the environmental 
externality (δ = 0.5) and the unbiased baseline (BL = 84). The upward-sloping diagonal dotted 
line marks the area below which IC surplus is less than zero. This figure indicates that, first of all, 
the global social planner’s optimal policy (pc,  𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 �) = (0.50, 0) is not in this feasible set. In 
addition, the “unbiased policy” (pc, 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 �) = (0.50, 84) is also not feasible. These policies have a 
negative surplus for ICs. The ICs’ optimal policy (pc,  𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 �) = (0.35, 86) would be obtained if the 
ICs have all the bargaining power. The more bargaining power lies with DCs, the more the 
policy will move towards the lower right side of the Pareto set. Point A gives most surplus to 
ICs, while point B gives most surplus to DCs (while ICs have zero surplus). The dotted line 
joining point A and B gives some indication of the true Pareto efficient set.
25
The results discussed above assumed that γ = 0: the net effect of deadweight loss of 
raising revenues in ICs cancels out against any utility that ICs may receive from transferring 
funds to poor countries. Changing γ will change the location of the ICs’ optimal policy choice. If 
γ > 0, transfers are more costly for ICs. This moves the feasible policy set further away from the 
globally efficient solution. For example, when γ = 0.25, the ICs optimal policy choice would be 
(p
  
c, 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 �) = (0.25, 85), while, within the Pareto optimal set, DCs are best off with (pc, 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 �) = (0.35, 
84). Although the ICs would optimally choose a baseline that is slightly more generous than if γ 
= 0, they choose to discount the price much more heavily, resulting in a larger global efficiency 
loss from the global planner’s perspective.
26 The IC surplus from the “unbiased policy” (pc
                                                 
25 The fact that the bottom right quadrant of Figure 10 reports a 2-dimensional Pareto region is a result of the 
discrete grid. As the grid becomes finer, the Pareto set will converge to a curve (approximately between points A 
and B).  
, 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 �) 
= (0.50, 84) is now much more negative than if γ = 0. In extreme cases, the Pareto set covers a 
26 More detailed calculations available from the authors on request. 30 
 
region with very low pc
 In contrast, if γ < 0, the feasible policy set will move closer to the globally efficient 
policy. For example, when γ = -0.25, the ICs optimal policy choice would be (p
  and very high 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 �. In that case, no globally meaningful avoided 
deforestation policy is possible. 
c, 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 �) = (0.50, 
87), while DCs are best off with (pc, 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 �) = (0.60, 83). The feasible and Pareto efficient policy set 
is more efficient from the global planner’s perspective. The “unbiased policy” (pc
The results in this section have highlighted that under reasonable assumptions (γ ≥ 0), 
ICs should find it in their best interest to propose a deforestation policy with a combination of 
discounted credits and baselines that are more stringent than the expected “business as usual” 
deforestation rate. Moreover, the framework has made explicit the role of benefits and costs of 
transfers. Depending on negotiators’ perception of their country’s inherent willingness to 
transfer (γ), this approach can help them design a “most desired policy”. Greater willingness to 
transfer will generate larger global efficiency gains. The framework also makes explicit the 
feasible set of policies, which could help DCs determine how far they can bargain with ICs about 
the division of rents  and to what extent they should offer concessions on price relative to 
baselines. 
, 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 �) = (0.50, 
84) is now feasible. Finally, note that some feasible policies do not require a combination of 
discounting and stringent baselines – in fact, they do the opposite. 
5. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
This paper built a model of landowner decisions and a voluntary avoided deforestation 
program. It demonstrated the tradeoff between three policy criteria: efficiency, avoided 
deforestation and payments per unit of avoided deforestation (transfers) when there is 
asymmetric information. It analyzed the effects of increasing the scale of required projects 
including when returns are spatially correlated. It then explored the effects on the three policy 
criteria of two other policy levers: changing the payment per hectare and the baseline. Finally, the 
paper identifies policies that are individually  rational for both industrialized and developing 
countries and are on the Pareto frontier.        
Summary of the main findings: 
•  We conclude that under almost all circumstances, voluntary deforestation programs (or, 
in fact, general offset programs) will perform better with increased required scale of 31 
 
project. Only under very special conditions on the return distribution will increasing the 
required scale of the projects in the program not lead to improved policy outcomes. 
•  A global social planner would maximize efficiency, but this is not individually rational for 
ICs. 
•  If the ICs are averse to transferring funds to developing countries (γ ≥ 0), their preferred 
contract involves a combination of credit discounting (price below δ) and setting 
baselines stricter than business-as-usual (r* > 0). These contracts are inefficient. The 
feasible and Pareto efficient contract set between ICs and DCs contains contracts that 
involve a combination of credit discounting and stringent baselines. 
•  As the aversion to transfers γ falls, the tradeoff between efficiency and ICs’ willingness to 
participate diminishes. 
Our key messages for policy makers are three. First, make ‘projects’ as large as possible. 
Regional or national scale REDD programs where funds or credits are transferred to the 
government on the basis of aggregated regional or national monitoring data will be much more 
efficient and offer better value for money. Satellite monitoring of forests is feasible and takes 
away any ability to cheat. DC governments will not (necessarily) achieve avoided deforestation 
through smaller-scale voluntary payment programs, but could use a variety of policy instruments 
to achieve reductions (e.g., strengthening property rights for landowners, abolishing agricultural 
subsidies).  
Second, invest in research to improve understanding of deforestation drivers. This will 
allow more accurate assessment of returns and hence business as usual deforestation rates. 
Moreover, this will help identify domestic policies to effectively control deforestation.  
Third, the use of credit discounting or below market prices and the use of baselines more 
stringent than business as usual can be necessary when avoided deforestation policies depend on 
voluntary contributions from industrialized countries. The level of discounting and stringency 
required and their optimal mix depends on the developing country marginal cost of abatement 
(returns distribution), the level of observation errors and the industrialized countries’ generosity 
toward developing countries.  
If industrialized countries can be encouraged to be more generous it will be easier to 
create an efficient international REDD framework. Combined with effective domestic policies 
that respond to the international incentives, this could meet the expectations of those who 
promote avoided deforestation as a key climate mitigation option in the short term. 32 
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Appendix 1 – Proof of Proposition 2 
We calculate the efficiency gain ∆Sn=2  from 2-plot REDD relative to no policy, and 
compare this to the efficiency gain 2*∆S  with  ∆S  defined as 
∫ (𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸 − 𝑟𝑟)
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  (20)  
 
These terms refer to the areas A-F in Figure 6. The first and last terms represent areas C 
+ D, the second term represents A + B and the third term represents area E + F. Using  
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we can rewrite (20) as  
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Which can in turn be simplified to  
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This can be further simplified to  
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Hence, a 2-plot program is more efficient than a single-plot program if the last two terms 
exceed ∆S. First, let’s expand the second term using (20) 
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The inequality holds because ∫ �1 − 𝐼𝐼 𝜀𝜀(𝑟𝑟2)�
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Then, let’s expand the third term in (23).  
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Hence, a 2-plot program is more efficient than a single-plot program if 
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Table A1. The impact of increasing the required project scale: alternative returns distributions. 
fr 1-plot  (r)  2-plot  10-plot  100-plot  σε
∆efficiency 
 = 0 
         
N(-1,1)  1.3331  1.4157  1.8248  2.4744  2.5319 
N(0,1)  3.0515  3.2681  4.0739  4.8713  4.8854 
BMN(0.5,0.1)  1.5379  1.4492  1.2537  1.6858  1.9975 
           
AD           
N(-1,1)  5.3387  5.5368  6.5951  8.9545  9.1848 
N(0,1)  13.0382  13.4370  15.6801  19.0864  19.1462 
BMN(0.5,0.1)  19.9492  18.7200  15.6702  21.0403  25.0099 
           
TT           
N(-1,1)  4.8817  4.8158  4.5139  4.5562  4.5924 
N(0,1)  10.2271  9.9261  9.1712  9.5569  9.5731 
BMN(0.5,0.1)  14.0357  13.1049  10.1423  10.9875  12.5058 
           
PAD           
N(-1,1)  0.9149  0.8702  0.6845  0.5089  0.5000 
N(0,1)  0.7845  0.7388  0.5849  0.5007  0.5000 
BMN(0.5,0.1)  0.7045  0.7001  0.6472  0.5222  0.5000 
           
Opt-in           
N(-1,1)  4.88%  18.30%  58.42%  97.47%  100% 
N(0,1)  10.23%  35.53%  78.36%  99.72%  100% 
BMN(0.5,0.1)  14.05%  44.53%  65.95%  84.71%  100% 
Notes: Each row is based on 10,000 random draws from the probability 
distributions.  δ  =  pc  = 0.5. fε
 
(ε) ~ N(0,0.5). ∆efficiency,  AD  and  TT  are all 
normalized per 100 plots. Assigned baselines are unbiased. 
The effect of scale is the same for the N(0,1) distribution and the central case 
distribution. Both efficiency, AD and PAD improve with scale. The BMN(0.5,0.1) distribution 
demonstrates the results in Section 3.1.2: there exist returns distributions for which increasing 
scale does not unambiguously improve efficiency.  The intuition is that there are many plots with 
returns around pc = δ (as well as returns close to -pc). Therefore, the BMN(0,5,0.1) distribution 
has many realizations in area C in Figure 6, which can reduce efficiency by Proposition 2 (in the 38 
 
2-plot model). In fact, we find that a single-plot policy is more efficient than a 2-plot policy. 
However, such distributions are highly stylized and unlikely to represent true returns 
distributions. 
Figure A1 summarizes this finding by plotting the efficiency gain as a fraction of the 
efficient (σε
 
 = 0) solution. 
Figure A1. The impact on efficiency of increasing the project scale, for n = 1, 2, 10 and 100. 
 
 
Table A2 shows that the conclusion in Section 3.1.3 (Table 2) that larger required project 
scale mitigates the adverse impact of spatial correlation also holds for an alternative N(0,1) 
returns distribution. 
 












n = 1 n = 2  n = 10 n = 100
N(-1,1) N(0,1) BMN(0.5,0.1)39 
 
Table A2. The impact of spatially correlated returns and observation errors, for n = 1 and n = 
100 for an alternative returns distribution. 










 = 0 
ρr = 0, ρε ρ  = 0  r = 0.5, ρε ρ  = 0.5  r = 0.9, ρε ρ  = 0.9  r = 0.99, ρε    = 
  ∆efficienc
 
                 
N(-1,1)  1.3331  2.4744  1.3307  2.4130  1.3266  2.0204  1.3267  1.5901  2.5319 
N(0,1)  3.0515  4.8713  3.0575  4.8302  3.0517  4.2620  3.0347  3.4793  4.8854 
                   
AD                   


















                     
TT                   









9.5440  9.5731 
                   
PAD                   
N(-1,1)  0.9149  0.5089  0.9165  0.5184  0.9159  0.6070  0.9185  0.8024  0.5000 
N(0,1)  0.7845  0.5007  0.7822  0.5033  0.7830  0.5543  0.7830  0.7037  0.5000 
                   
Opt-in                   
N(-1,1)  4.88%  97.47%  4.90%  94.96%  4.88%  78.40%  4.87%  37.28%  100% 
N(0,1)  10.23%  99.72%  10.21%  98.71%  10.21%  86.78%  10.15%  61.79%  100% 
Notes: Each row is based on 10,000 random draws from the probability distributions. δ = pc = 0.5. σε
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